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5. The East Asian Experience: Indonesia
Budy P. Resosudarmo and Yogi Vidyattama
1. INTRoDUCTIoN
Indonesia is an archipelago of 17,000 islands stretching between the Indian and 
Pacific	Oceans,	linking	the	continents	of	Asia	and	Australia.	It	hosts	abundant	
natural	resources	such	as	oil	and	gas,	as	well	as	rich	and	biodiversified	forest	
and marine resources. In 2004 Indonesia’s population was approximately 230 
million, and it is growing at an annual rate of 1.5 per cent. The country has 
350 ethnic groups, the largest being Javanese (45 per cent), Sundanese (14 per 
cent) and Malays (7.5 per cent). The main religious divisions are Muslim (88 
per cent), Protestant (5 per cent), Catholic (3 per cent) and Hindu (2 per cent). 
About	23	per	cent	of	the	country’s	labour	force	are	farmers,	significant	num-
bers of whom produce the country’s main staple, rice. 
A major topic of concern to Indonesian policy-makers and academics since 
independence in 1945 has been the imbalances in development among regions. 
In the early years of independence, Java had better roads, universities, hos-
pitals and other infrastructure than was available in the off-Java islands. The 
tensions	already	existing	between	Indonesia’s	ethnic	groups	were	amplified	by	
resentment at these imbalances. However, faced with armed insurrections by 
separatist movements in Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, South Sulawesi and 
Maluku (legge 1961; Mackie 1980), the weak central government in Jakarta 
had little room to implement any sort of regional development policy (or even 
economic	development	policy)	to	reduce	imbalances	during	the	first	two	dec-
ades of independence. Instead, these years were spent consolidating the unitary 
state and strengthening the central government. In practice, economic develop-
ment began only when Soeharto came to power in 1966 (Thee 2001).
Backed	by	the	military,	Soeharto	took	over	from	Soekarno	–	the	first	presi-
dent – when the latter proved incapable of controlling the political chaos sup-
posedly created by a failed coup carried out by the Indonesian Communist 
Party in 1965. When Soeharto took power the Indonesian economy was in a 
shambles.	 Inflation	was	 running	at	600	per	cent	per	annum,	production	and	
trade were stagnant, and economic infrastructure was in disrepair (Thee 2003). 
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A	sizeable	proportion	of	 the	population	was	poor	as	defined	by	the	Sajogyo	
poverty line – that is, they had a per capita monthly expenditure below the 
cash equivalent of 26.67 kilograms of rice per month. Booth (1993) found that 
approximately 78 per cent of the population of rural Java was poor in the mid-
1960s, as opposed to 69 per cent in the off-Java islands. overall, more than 50 
per cent of rural Indonesians were very poor at a time when over 85 per cent of 
the population was living in rural areas. 
Soeharto	was	well	aware	that	the	key	to	sustained	public	support	was	to	fix	
the	economy.	He	announced	a	balanced	budgetary	policy	to	bring	the	inflation	
rate down. Foreign trade was liberalized to make Indonesia more attractive to 
foreign investors, and ties with the international donor community were re-
established to obtain concessionary loans to rehabilitate previously neglected 
physical infrastructure. These policies succeeded in turning the economy 
around	and	averting	disaster.	The	inflation	rate	fell	from	636	per	cent	in	1966	
to 9 per cent in 1970, while GDP grew by 6.7 per cent annually (Thee 2003). 
The improvement in economic conditions throughout the country reduced, 
but did not eliminate, tensions between ethnic groups, particularly between 
Javanese and non-Javanese, and generated more solid regional integration. A 
comparison	of	the	Java	and	off-Java	poverty	figures	based	on	the	Sajogyo	pov-
erty line shows why. While the proportion of poor people in rural Java fell by 
7 per cent between the mid-1960s and early 1970s (from 78 to 71 per cent), 
the proportion of poor people living in the off-Java islands declined by 26 per 
cent (from 69 to 43 per cent) (Booth 1993). This was in spite of the fact that 
infrastructure in Java, particularly in urban areas, was still more advanced than 
that in the off-Java islands. 
Soeharto and his economic team, while aiming to achieve high national 
economic growth, clearly realized the need for more balanced interregional 
development, particularly between Java and the off-Java islands. The main 
focus of this chapter is to examine the policies implemented by Soeharto and 
his successors and evaluate their success. Section 2 provides a descriptive 
narrative of patterns of regional development from the 1970s until recently. 
Section 3 is devoted to describing the main national economic policies imple-
mented	during	this	period.	The	final	section	summarizes	the	key	ingredients	of	
success (and failure) in the case of regional development policy implementa-
tion in Indonesia. 
2. PATTERNS oF REGIoNAl DEVEloPMENT
The two main indicators utilized in this section to observe patterns and trends of 
regional development are provincial gross domestic product (provincial GDP) 
and provincial GDP per capita. Relatively reliable data on these indicators are 
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available from the central statistical agency (BPS) for the period of interest 
here, from the early 1970s onwards. The other indicator used is the proportion 
of poor people in a province. Data on this indicator are available from 1990, 
but are of a lower quality and less reliable than the data for provincial GDP. 
For practical purposes this section will divide the period of observation, 
1971–2002,	into	three	subperiods.	The	first	is	1971–83,	which	coincided	with	
a natural resources boom. During this period Indonesia began to exploit its 
natural resources, particularly oil, gas and timber, on a large scale, so generat-
ing a large income for the country. The second subperiod is 1984–96. During 
this period Indonesia carried out various economic reforms, including trade, 
investment	and	financial	liberalization,	to	boost	the	growth	of	non-resource-
based industries as the income from natural resources declined. The third sub-
period is 1997–2002, a time of economic crisis and recovery. 
It is important to note here that the number of provinces in Indonesia has 
changed over time. From independence until 1976 there were 26 provinces: 
Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, West Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, lampung, 
Bengkulu, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, yogyakarta, East Java, West 
Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North 
Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Bali, West 
Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua. East Timor was a 
province of Indonesia from 1976 to 1999. In 2001, Bangka-Belitung, Banten, 
Gorontalo and North Maluku became new provinces after separating from 
South Sumatra, West Java, North Sulawesi and Maluku respectively. In 2004 
another new province was established, namely West Irian Jaya, which used to 
be part of Papua. 
In the early 1970s, at the time when this study begins, GDP per capita was 
lower in the provinces of Java than in the off-Java islands, except for a few 
provinces in Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara. Java had a higher proportion of poor 
people than other parts of Indonesia at this time. Almost all provinces were 
dominated by agricultural activities; manufacturing activities were scarce. 
The Fastest and Slowest­growing Provinces
During 1972–83, national GDP grew at an annual rate of approximately 7 per 
cent. Among the fastest-growing provinces, four – East Kalimantan, Aceh, 
Papua and Jakarta – stood out with annual GDP growth rates exceeding 10 per 
cent (Table 5.1). When provincial GDP without mining is observed, however, 
the	growth	rates	of	East	Kalimantan,	Aceh	and	Papua	fall	significantly.	Clearly,	
large-scale extractions of oil and gas were the major engine of regional growth 
for these three provinces during this period – and for the country as a whole.1 
Indonesian exports during this period were dominated by natural resources, 
particularly oil and gas. Government revenues from oil and gas comprised 
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around 70 per cent of total government revenues during this period (Thorbecke 
1992). Meanwhile in Jakarta, non-mining, mainly labour-intensive, industries 
were developing. 
At the other end of the scale, three provinces grew at an annual rate of below 
4 per cent during this period. They were North Sulawesi, North Sumatra and 
Jambi. The main problem in these provinces was that the agricultural sector 
was growing relatively slowly, and other sectors were not growing fast enough 
to compensate for this.
While the national economy continued to grow at a rate of approximately 7 
per cent between 1984 and 1996, no province achieved average annual growth 
of	over	10	per	cent	during	this	period	and	only	five	provinces	managed	growth	
of over 8 per cent: West Kalimantan, lampung, Bali, North Sumatra and West 
Java. The provinces in the mineral-rich regions were no longer among the faster 
growing. In West Kalimantan, the wood-processing sector was the main engine 
of growth; in lampung, North Sumatra and West Java, it was the low-skilled 
but labour-intensive industries; and in Bali, it was the tourism industry (Hill 
1989b). on the other hand, only one province, Riau, grew by (just) less than 4 
per cent. Hence, no region was actually locked into very slow growth. The case 
of Riau shows that the development of a mining industry does not necessarily 
flow	on	to	the	development	of	other	industries	in	a	region,	most	likely	because	
there is not much of a link between mining and local industries.
Between 1997 and 2002, a period encompassing the economic crisis of 
1997–98, national GDP growth averaged only 1 per cent annually. The fol-
lowing seven provinces experienced negative GDP growth during this period: 
Maluku, Aceh, West Java, South Sumatra,2 Jakarta, North Sulawesi3 and East 
Java. The two worst performers were Maluku and Aceh, because of the social 
and	political	conflict	in	these	regions.	In	Jakarta,	West	Java	and	East	Java	the	
main drag on performance was the manufacturing sector, which was severely 
affected by the crisis. West Nusa Tenggara and Papua alone grew by more than 
4 per cent during this period, West Nusa Tenggara because of the development 
of a mining industry and its relatively low provincial GDP at the start of the 
period, and Papua because of its government service sector. 
If we shift our focus to provincial GDP per capita, the picture is as follows. 
Between	1972	and	1983,	the	five	fastest-growing	provinces	were	Aceh,	East	
Kalimantan,	Papua,	Riau	and	Jakarta.	The	significantly	lower	growth	rates	for	
GDP	per	capita	without	mining	in	all	except	Jakarta	confirms	the	importance	
of mining for these provinces. During this period two provinces, lampung and 
Jambi, recorded negative annual growth rates, because population growth was 
outstripping	GDP	growth.	Both	provinces	experienced	significant	influxes	of	
migrants from Java during this period (Hardjono 1977; Bakir and Humaidi 
1989).
Between 1984 and 1996, the highest per capita growth rate was achieved by 
Bali,	which	had	never	previously	been	among	the	five	fastest-growing	prov-
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inces. In fact, neither had any of the other four: lampung, Central Java, North 
Sumatra and East Java. North Sumatra and lampung had previously been 
among	the	five	slowest-growing	provinces	in	terms	of	GDP	per	capita.	Aceh,	
Riau and East Kalimantan, previously among the fastest-growing provinces, 
were	now	among	the	five	slowest	growing.	
Between 1997 and 2002, nine provinces had negative growth in annual GDP 
per capita: West Java, Maluku, Aceh, South Sumatra, Riau, Central Kaliman-
tan, East Java, yogyakarta and Central Java. Some of these provinces – Riau, 
Central Kalimantan, Central Java and yogyakarta – actually experienced posi-
tive GDP growth but this was exceeded by their population growth. Jakarta, on 
the other hand, experienced negative GDP growth but positive growth in GDP 
per	capita,	because	of	the	outflow	to	rural	areas	of	workers	laid	off	during	the	
crisis, which reduced the capital’s population.
The following conclusions can be drawn from this overview of growth in 
provincial GDP and provincial GDP per capita. First, no province was consist-
ently either the fastest or slowest-growing region during the entire period of 
observation. Second, until the crisis, no province was locked into very slow 
growth. Third, there was much less variation in growth during the 1984–96 
period	 than	 during	 the	 other	 periods	 of	 observation	 (see	 the	 coefficients	 of	
variation in Table 5.1), indicating that until the crisis the growth of most prov-
inces had tended to cluster around the national average. only a few provinces, 
such	 as	Papua,	Aceh	and	East	Kalimantan,	had	growth	 rates	 that	fluctuated	
significantly	from	the	national	average	during	this	period.	Finally,	due	to	the	
clustering of growth rates around the national average, economic activity pre-
dominantly remained concentrated in Java and, to a lesser extent, Sumatra. In 
2002 these two regions respectively produced 54 per cent and 26 per cent of 
Indonesia’s GDP, compared to 55 per cent and 29 per cent in 1971.
Structural Change and Industrial Transformation
Agriculture was the most important sector in most provinces in Indonesia in 
the early 1970s. It contributed more than 50 per cent of provincial GDP in 
14 of the country’s 26 provinces in 1971, and between 33 and 50 per cent in 
another nine (Table 5.2a). 
By the beginning of the 1980s, the contribution of the agricultural sector to 
provincial GDP had declined in all provinces. In 1983 agriculture contributed 
less than 25 per cent of provincial GDP in seven provinces: West Java, Papua, 
South Sumatra, Aceh, East Kalimantan, Riau and Jakarta. The development of 
a mining industry in Papua, South Sumatra, East Kalimantan, Aceh and Riau, 
and of non-mining industries in Jakarta and West Java, was responsible for 
this transformation. In all provinces except yogyakarta, South Sulawesi and 
Southeast Sulawesi, manufacturing grew more quickly than agriculture during 
the early 1970s to mid-1980s (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.2a Indonesia: Proincial GDP, 1971 and 1983a
Region 1971
With Mining Without Mining
Share of GDP (%) GDP 
(Rp 
billion)
GDP/PC 
(Rp  
thousand)
GDP 
(Rp 
billion)
GDP/PC 
(Rp 
thousand)A M S
Aceh 61.7 14.5 23.8 452.1 224.9 452.1 224.9
N. Sumatra 37.5 20.3 42.2 2,455.1 371.0* 2,345.7* 354.5*
Riau 7.2 81.7 11.1 2,534.6* 1,544.4* 636.1 387.6*
W. Sumatra 50.1 8.2 41.7 583.1 208.8 582.2 208.5
Jambi 51.2 13.1 35.7 353.4 351.0 346.5 344.1
S. Sumatra 26.2 36.8 37.0 1,709.8 497.1* 1,442.4 419.4*
lampung 55.7 8.5 35.8 594.3 214.4 594.3 214.4
Bengkulu 56.9 6.0 37.1 110.0* 212.0 108.3* 208.8
        
Jakarta 4.4 16.0 79.6 2,642.2* 576.6* 2,642.2* 576.6*
W. Java 42.6 19.9 37.5 4,417.9* 204.0 4,415.5* 203.9
C. Java 50.1 18.6 31.3 3,777.8* 172.7* 3,753.9
* 171.6*
yogyakarta 36.6 19.2 44.2 439.3 176.7* 438.1 176.2
E. Java 49.6 14.6 35.8 5,274.8* 206.4 5,265.1* 206.0
        
W. Kalimantan 57.3 13.3 29.4 477.8 236.1 477.8 236.1
C. Kalimantan 46.7 2.0 51.3 191.1* 272.3 191.1* 272.3
S. Kalimantan 46.3 10.7 43.0 439.3 258.6 424.4 249.8
E. Kalimantan 36.8 15.1 48.1 469.0 639.3* 443.7 604.8*
        
N. Sulawesi 45.4 12.4 42.2 491.5 285.9 490.5 285.3
C. Sulawesi 66.3 3.8 29.9 120.5* 131.7* 120.5* 131.7*
S. Sulawesi 54.2 9.2 36.6 961.3 185.5 950.7 183.5
S.E. Sulawesi 47.1 41.4 11.5 165.4* 232.1 106.1* 148.8*
        
Bali 56.0 7.9 36.1 504.4 237.7 501.3 236.3
W. Nusa Tenggara 58.8 2.5 38.7 269.8 122.1* 269.8 122.1*
E. Nusa Tenggara 68.2 3.6 28.2 255.4 110.8* 255.4 110.8*
        
Maluku 68.0 2.7 29.3 271.4 249.0 270.0 247.6
Papua 56.3 7.6 36.1 213.6* 231.3 210.0* 227.4
        
Mean  313.6 259.7
Standard deviation  276.8 121.8
Coefficient	of	variation  0.88  0.47
Notes:
GDP/PC = GDP per capita; A = agricultural sector; M = manufacturing sector including min-
ing;	S	=	services	sector;	*	=	among	the	five	provinces	with	the	highest	GDP	or	GDP	per	capita;	 
*	=	among	the	five	provinces	with	the	lowest	GDP	or	GDP	per	capita.
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Table 5.2a (continued)
Region 1983
With Mining Without Mining
Share of GDP (%) GDP 
(Rp  
billion)
GDP/PC 
(Rp 
thousand)
GDP 
(Rp  
billion)
GDP/PC 
(Rp 
thousand)A M S
Aceh 16.9 69.6 13.5 3,425.2 1,204.8* 2,206.2 776.0*
N. Sumatra 33.9 23.0 43.1 3,473.7 385.3 3,285.9* 364.5
Riau 3.2 90.0 6.8 7,503.9* 3,161.4* 1,092.2 460.2*
W. Sumatra 31.9 21.3 46.8 1,234.3 339.8 1,224.0 337.0
Jambi 41.5 19.2 39.3 530.8 326.2 472.2 290.2
S. Sumatra 18.4 48.5 33.1 3,437.6 674.1* 2,608.9 511.6*
lampung 47.4 12.6 40.0 1,057.2 193.4* 1,054.1 192.8*
Bengkulu 51.0 7.2 41.8 260.8* 298.9 259.2* 297.1
        
Jakarta 1.7 24.9 73.4 8,347.9* 1,142.4* 8,347.9* 1,142.4*
W. Java 24.2 33.2 42.6 10,190.7* 343.6 8,457.3* 285.1
C. Java 37.4 15.4 47.2 7,300.2* 274.3 7,268.9* 273.1
yogyakarta 33.3 15.8 50.9 763.4 268.9* 759.4 267.5
E. Java 33.7 17.0 49.3 10,848.3* 356.0 10,790.3* 354.1
        
W. Kalimantan 37.6 19.5 42.9 850.6 320.0 848.3 319.2
C. Kalimantan 33.7 18.9 47.4 478.3* 453.6 475.8 451.2
S. Kalimantan 32.3 14.3 53.4 901.1 410.0 844.1 384.0
E. Kalimantan 7.3 76.8 15.9 4,316.4 3,000.2* 1,504.3 1,045.6*
        
N. Sulawesi 35.2 12.3 52.5 671.6 296.9 668.9 295.7
C. Sulawesi 44.0 14.7 41.3 364.4* 252.6* 356.3* 247.0*
S. Sulawesi 46.6 7.9 45.5 1,798.1 282.0 1,749.6 274.4
S.E. Sulawesi 50.4 12.9 36.7 294.3* 285.4 265.1* 257.1*
        
Bali 43.1 12.5 44.4 902.5 348.0 902.5 348.0
W. Nusa Tenggara 53.2 9.4 37.4 518.7 177.8* 509.8 174.8*
E. Nusa Tenggara 56.3 6.7 37.0 498.3 172.1* 496.3 171.4*
        
Maluku 45.5 17.7 36.8 478.7* 312.0 460.1* 299.9
Papua 21.7 58.5 19.8 852.2 671.8 420.3* 331.4
        
Mean 613.5 390.4
Standard deviation 755.2 235.6
Coefficient	of	variation 1.23  0.60
a Provinces for which no data are available (Bangka-Belitung, Banten, Gorontalo and North 
Maluku) have been omitted from the table. 
Source: BPS (various years).
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Table 5.2b Indonesia: Proincial GDP, 1996 and 2002
Region 1996
With Mining Without Mining
Share of GDP (%) GDP
(Rp 
billion)
GDP/PC
(Rp  
thousand)
GDP
(Rp 
billion)
GDP/PC
(Rp 
thousand)A M S
Aceh 20.4 60.8 18.8 7,055.6 1,788.4* 5,059.3 1,282.4*
N. Sumatra 26.1 32.2 41.6 9,628.5 851.6 9,385.3* 830.1
Riau 6.8 76.7 16.5 12,157.5* 2,996.5* 5,339.6 1,316.1*
W. Sumatra 20.8 30.2 48.9 2,805.8 639.1 2,619.7 596.7
Jambi 27.9 30.1 42.0 1,309.0 532.4 1,250.4 508.6
S. Sumatra 19.3 45.1 35.6 7,021.9 947.2 5,886.5 794.1
Bangka-Belitung n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
lampung 34.0 27.6 38.4 3,108.3 456.7* 3,043.4 447.2*
Bengkulu 31.0 15.3 53.7 661.7* 452.0* 640.8* 437.6*
        
Jakarta 0.2 38.0 61.8 22,462.5* 2,404.6* 22,462.5* 2,404.6*
Banten n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
W. Java 13.7 49.3 37.0 27,777.8* 692.4 26,317.0* 656.0
C. Java 20.3 38.7 41.0 18,260.4* 611.1 18,030.3* 603.4
yogyakarta 17.0 25.5 57.4 1,655.3 567.9 1,632.7 560.2
E. Java 17.4 40.9 41.7 25,759.2* 754.9 25,349.4* 742.9
        
W. Kalimantan 23.2 28.2 48.6 2,514.7 673.8 2,481.0 664.7
C. Kalimantan 37.0 21.2 41.8 1,262.1 748.6 1,222.9 725.4
S. Kalimantan 21.5 38.8 39.6 2,288.4 773.0 2,049.2 692.2
E. Kalimantan 9.1 65.4 25.5 8,553.7 3,520.9* 5,994.4 2,467.4*
        
N. Sulawesi 24.5 26.9 48.6 1,589.9 591.8 1,510.1 562.1
Gorontalo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C. Sulawesi 44.0 23.5 32.4 930.1* 465.8* 903.3* 452.3*
S. Sulawesi 41.6 25.9 32.5 4,470.1 581.0 4,305.7 559.7
S.E. Sulawesi 31.1 24.9 44.0 789.1* 480.1 761.5* 463.4
        
Bali 19.5 14.8 65.7 2,580.7 882.5 2,561.2 875.8*
W. Nusa Tenggara 36.3 16.9 46.8 1,259.4 339.7* 1,220.2 329.1*
E. Nusa Tenggara 38.1 13.8 48.1 1,149.1* 315.6* 1,129.4* 310.2*
        
Maluku 29.0 37.4 33.6 1232.3* 575.4 1,156.3 539.9
N. Maluku n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua 19.4 70.2 10.4 2,141.5 1,059.7* 1,002.8* 496.2
        
Mean  950.1 781.5
Standard deviation  797.9 532.0
Coefficient	of	variation  0.84  0.68
Note:
GDP/PC = GDP per capita; A = agricultural sector; M = manufacturing sector including min-
ing;	S	=	services	sector;	*	=	among	the	five	provinces	with	the	highest	GDP	or	GDP	per	capita;	 
*	=	among	the	five	provinces	with	the	lowest	GDP	or	GDP	per	capita.
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Table 5.2b (continued)
Region 2002
With Mining Without Mining
Share of GDP (%) GDP 
(Rp  
billion)
GDP/PC 
(Rp 
thousand)
GDP 
(Rp  
billion)
GDP/PC 
(Rp 
thousand)A M S
Aceh 28.2 44.5 27.4 5,707.2 1,418.8* 4,570.0 1,136.1*
N. Sumatra 29.9 29.6 40.5 10,526.1 885.0 10,390.8* 873.7
Riau 8.7 74.1 17.2 14,451.0* 2,734.6* 7,145.4 1,352.1*
W. Sumatra 22.0 28.2 49.8 3,136.2 731.0 2,968.3 691.8
Jambi 28.7 31.4 40.0 1,542.8 622.0 1,378.0 555.6
S. Sumatra 20.7 41.7 37.6 6,634.6 820.9 5,692.5 704.4
Bangka-Belitung 24.9 44.1 31.0 1,270.8 1,390.4* 1,088.0 1,190.4*
lampung 34.7 25.3 39.9 3,514.3 512.2 3,392.7 494.5
Bengkulu 32.6 12.0 55.5 741.8* 452.1* 718.7* 438.1*
        
Jakarta 0.2 34.0 65.8 21,842.6* 2,603.8* 21,842.6* 2,603.8*
Banten 9.1 56.8 34.1 6,194.5 726.0 6,187.3 725.1
W. Java 12.8 51.4 35.9 24,664.2* 542.8 23,381.2* 514.6
C. Java 19.7 37.4 42.9 19,095.1* 602.5 18,802.1* 593.3
yogyakarta 15.6 23.6 60.8 1,718.8 544.5 1,699.2 538.3
E. Java 17.2 34.4 48.4 25,342.7* 721.0 24,852.0* 707.0
        
W. Kalimantan 24.1 27.7 48.2 2,831.3 679.5 2,788.7 669.3
C. Kalimantan 41.6 14.6 43.8 1,357.5 697.0 1,334.1 684.9
S. Kalimantan 22.4 39.4 38.2 2,658.7 870.9 2,175.0 712.4
E. Kalimantan 8.1 67.6 24.2 10,641.2 4,147.7* 7,158.7 2,790.3*
        
N. Sulawesi 26.2 27.0 46.8 1,552.5 759.7 1,449.1 709.1
Gorontalo 30.4 22.3 47.3 458.2* 535.9 440.2* 514.9
C. Sulawesi 44.9 17.3 37.8 1,111.1 489.6 1,083.1 477.3
S. Sulawesi 33.5 23.1 43.4 5,227.4 634.1 4,990.3 605.3
S.E. Sulawesi 31.4 20.2 48.3 950.8* 496.5 920.3* 480.6
        
Bali 19.1 15.7 65.2 2,898.7 900.4 2,878.1 894.0
W. Nusa Tenggara 25.0 39.5 35.5 1,951.4 472.6* 1,382.4 334.8*
E. Nusa Tenggara 35.7 10.5 53.9 1,406.9 358.5* 1,390.4 354.2*
        
Maluku 33.0 7.1 59.9 543.7* 451.5* 538.8* 447.5*
N. Maluku 28.3 26.3 45.4 368.4* 469.4* 347.4* 442.7*
Papua 17.9 65.4 16.7 2,734.0 1,160.6 1,157.0 491.2
        
Mean 947.7 790.9
Standard deviation 810.4 561.0
Coefficient	of	variation 0.86  0.71
Source: BPS (various years).
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By 1996, the share of the agricultural sector in provincial GDP had fallen 
below 50 per cent in all provinces, and contributed between 25 and 50 per cent 
of GDP in only 11 provinces (Table 5.2b). With the exception of Aceh, South 
Sumatra, Riau, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi, the 
contribution of the agricultural sector to the provincial economy had declined 
in all provinces, and with the exception of Aceh, Riau, South Sumatra and 
East Kalimantan, the contribution of the manufacturing sector had increased. 
Hence, by the mid-1990s, the economic structure of almost all provinces had 
been	transformed	significantly	by	the	declining	contribution	of	the	agricultural	
sector and the increasing contribution of the manufacturing sector; the contri-
bution of the services sector, meanwhile, remained largely unchanged (Hill 
1989b). 
Bali is an interesting case. like most other provinces it experienced a struc-
tural transformation of its economy away from agriculture, but one based on 
services rather than manufacturing. The main reason was the boom in tourism 
in Bali during the 1970s and 1980s. Bali had attracted international tourists 
before then because of its unique culture and beautiful scenery, but with the 
opening of Ngurah Ray (Bali) airport to a few international airlines in the early 
1970s,	 the	number	of	 tourists	began	 to	grow	significantly.	Tourism	boomed	
during the 1980s, particularly when the government removed most restrictions 
on	international	flights	to	Bali	in	1985	and	provided	a	new	central	grant	trans-
fer to boost tourism development in the province (Jayasuriya and Nehen 1989). 
While reliance on agriculture dropped sharply between 1983 and 1996, the 
share of the services sector almost doubled, to 65.7 per cent of GDP. 
All sectors were affected by the crisis of 1997–98 but the manufacturing 
sector suffered most, followed by the services sector. As a result, between 
1996 and 2002 the contribution of the agricultural sector to provincial GDP 
increased in 15 provinces – all of them outside Java. Many analysts believe this 
to be a temporary phenomenon, however. 
GDP per Capita and Its Convergence
Although provincial growth rates have varied over time, some provinces have 
always	or	almost	always	been	among	the	five	richest,	and	others	among	the	five	
poorest. East Kalimantan, Riau and Jakarta have consistently been among the 
richest provinces, as has Aceh in GDP per capita terms since the early 1980s. 
East and West Nusa Tenggara, meanwhile, have consistently been among 
the poorest provinces. It is true that during some periods Jakarta, Riau, East 
Kalimantan and Aceh experienced some of the country’s lowest GDP growth 
rates, while East and West Nusa Tenggara had some of the highest. However, 
because of the relatively high initial GDP per capita of the former group, and 
the relatively low initial GDP per capita of the latter group, their relative rank-
ings have remained unchanged.
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It is important to understand how severe provincial per capita income dis-
parities are in Indonesia. From Tables 5.2a and 5.2b it can be seen that the GDP 
per capita of the provinces in the richest group has typically been around 10 
times that of the provinces in the poorest group throughout the period 1971–
2002.	A	 comparison	of	 the	 coefficients	 of	 variation	 for	 provincial	GDP	per	
capita in Indonesia with those in several other developing countries in latin 
America, Asia and Europe (see Chapter 1, this volume) also suggests that pro-
vincial income disparities in Indonesia are quite severe.
The	coefficients	of	variation	for	GDP	per	capita	 including	mining	shown	
in Tables 5.2a and 5.2b tell us that the disparity between rich and poor prov-
inces widened between 1971 and 1983, then narrowed considerably between 
1983 and 1996. In other words, there were signs of convergence in provincial 
GDP per capita (a lessening of disparity between provinces) in Indonesia dur-
ing	the1980s	and	1990s.	However,	the	coefficients	of	variation	without mining 
tell us that the disparity between rich and poor provinces continued to widen. 
Akita and lukman (1995) and Tadjoeddin, Suharyo and Mishra (2001), using 
weighted	coefficients	of	variation,	also	observed	this	phenomenon.	They	found	
that	 the	weighted	coefficient	of	variation	with	mining	declined	in	 the	1980s	
and	 1990s,	while	 the	weighted	 coefficient	 of	 variation	without	mining	was	
relatively	flat.	Garcia	Garcia	and	Soelistianingsih	(1998),	however,	found	both	
absolute and conditional convergence of provincial GDP per capita in Indone-
sia during the period 1983–93. 
The general conclusions that can be drawn from this overview are as follows. 
First, disparities in provincial income per capita in Indonesia are relatively 
large. Second, most provinces considered rich in the early 1970s remained so 
during the period of observation, while those that were poor tended to remain 
poor. Third, regardless of whether or not there were signs of convergence in 
provincial income per capita throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the stud-
ies	 that	 have	 been	 done	 do	 not	 suggest	 any	 significant	 signs	 of	 divergence	
either. The relatively fast growth rates of 1971–96 did not much affect dispari-
ties in provincial income per capita (Azis 1989; Hill 2000a). Neither did the 
slower growth rates experienced in 1996–2002, a period of economic crisis 
and subsequent recovery.
Poverty and Pro­poor Growth
Table 5.3 shows the provincial percentages of poor people in 1990, 1996 and 
2002.	Note	 that	BPS	did	not	publish	figures	 for	1990	 for	 Jambi,	Bengkulu,	
Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, 
Maluku and Papua, because of the small size of the sample in those provinces 
in that year. 
At the national level, 23.4 per cent of Indonesia’s population could be con-
sidered poor in 1990, a substantial drop from the estimate of around 40 per cent 
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Table 5.3 Indonesia: Proportion of Poor People by Proince, 1990, 1996 
and 2002 (%)a
 1990 1996        2002
Aceh 26.0 12.7 29.8*
North Sumatra 20.5* 13.2 15.8
Riau 22.1 12.6 13.6
West Sumatra 24.5 9.8* 11.6
Jambi – 14.6 13.2
South Sumatra 25.0 15.9 22.3
Bangka-Belitung n.a. n.a. 11.6
lampung 21.4 25.6 24.1
Bengkulu – 16.7 22.7
Jakarta 9.3* 2.4* 3.4*
Banten n.a. n.a. 9.2*
West Java 19.8* 11.1 13.4
Central Java 26.7* 21.6 23.1
yogyakarta 22.0 18.4 20.1
East Java 22.1 22.1 21.9
West Kalimantan 44.9* 24.2 15.5
Central Kalimantan – 13.5 11.9
South Kalimantan 33.6* 8.5* 8.5*
East Kalimantan – 9.7* 12.2
North Sulawesi 24.2 17.9 11.2*
Gorontalo n.a. n.a. 32.1*
Central Sulawesi – 22.3 24.9
South Sulawesi 16.1* 16.7 15.9
Southeast Sulawesi – 29.2* 24.2
Bali 16.8* 7.8* 6.9*
West Nusa Tenggara 36.6* 32.0* 27.8
East Nusa Tenggara 40.0* 38.9* 30.7*
Maluku – 44.6* 34.8*
North Maluku n.a. n.a. 14.0
Papua – 42.3* 41.8*
Indonesia 23.4 17.6 18.2
Notes:
n.a.:	 not	 applicable;	 –:	figures	not	 provided	because	of	 small	 sample	 size;	 *	 =	 among	 the	five	
provinces with the highest proportion of poor people; *	=	among	the	five	provinces	with	the	lowest	
proportion of poor people.
a BPS’s provincial poverty lines are utilized in this table. 
Source: BPS (various years).
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in 1976 (Booth 1993). The decline in the proportion of poor people continued 
until 1996, falling to 17.6 per cent in that year. Due to the economic crisis of 
1997–98, the proportion of poor people increased to 18.2 per cent in 2002 
–	still	lower	than	the	figure	for	1990	and	much	lower	than	the	figure	for	1976.	
Therefore,	in	general	it	can	be	said	there	has	been	a	significant	alleviation	of	
poverty in Indonesia over the past three decades (Booth 2000).
At the provincial level, it can be seen that in 1990 the provinces of Java 
had about the same proportion of poor people as the provinces of Sumatra 
and Sulawesi, although Central Java had a higher proportion than any other 
province in this group. The provinces of Nusa Tenggara and Kalimantan had 
a far higher proportion of poor people than the provinces of Java. Recall that 
in the early 1970s the proportion of poor people in Java was much higher than 
that in the off-Java islands. Hence, it seems that most of the poverty reduction 
experienced during the 1970s and 1980s was occurring in Java. Between 1990 
and 1996, the proportion of poor people in all of Java’s provinces continued to 
decline. The decline in Sumatra, Bali and Kalimantan during this period was 
sharper than that in Java, while the decline in Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi was 
less pronounced. 
Between 1996 and 2002, the proportion of poor people in the provinces of 
Java and Sumatra increased. In most other provinces, however, it continued to 
decline, if only slightly. North Sulawesi experienced a large reduction in pov-
erty because of the separation of Gorontalo, with its large proportion of poor 
people, into a separate province. Although poverty declined in Nusa Tenggara, 
Maluku and Papua, they were still among the country’s most poverty-stricken 
provinces in 2002.
The cases of Papua and Aceh deserve special mention. Papua has had a high 
and increasing income per capita since 1990 but nevertheless remains among 
the provinces with the highest proportion of poor people: over 40 per cent of 
Papuans were poor in 1996 and remained so in 2002. Aceh has had one of the 
highest incomes per capita since the early 1980s. The proportion of poor peo-
ple in Aceh decreased from 26.0 per cent in 1990 to 12.7 per cent in 1996, but 
then rose sharply to 29.8 per cent in 2002. This puts Aceh among the provinces 
with the highest proportion of poor people. Many blame the history of socio-
political	conflict	in	Aceh	for	this	situation.
Given the cases of Aceh and Papua, it is of interest to observe whether or 
not, in general, provincial development in Indonesia has had some effect on 
poverty, and in particular whether it has been able to reduce the proportion of 
poor people. Figure 5.1 plots the relationship between the change in the pro-
vincial proportion of poor people and the change in provincial GDP per capita 
between 1990 and 2002. The data cover18 provinces for which information on 
the proportion of poor people were available for both 1990 and 2002. Prov-
inces in which GDP per capita had grown and the proportion of poor people 
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had fallen appear in quadrant I. In these provinces, provincial development 
appears to have reduced the proportion of poor people. Provinces in which 
GDP per capita had grown, but the proportion of poor people had also grown, 
appear in quadrant II. In these provinces it appears that provincial develop-
ment was not able to reduce the proportion of poor people. Provinces in which 
GDP per capita had fallen and the proportion of poor people had risen appear 
in quadrant III. In these provinces it appears that the proportion of poor people 
increased due to a lack of provincial development. Provinces in which GDP 
per capita had fallen, but the proportion of poor people had also fallen, appear 
in quadrant IV. In these provinces the proportion of poor people decreased 
despite a lack of provincial development. 
of the 18 provinces, 15 appear in quadrant I, 1 in quadrant II (lampung), 
1 in quadrant III (Aceh) and 1 in quadrant IV (Riau). This outcome suggests 
that economic development probably did induce a reduction in the number 
of poor people in the majority of provinces in Indonesia, that is, that the poor 
benefited	 from	economic	development	 in	 their	 areas.	However,	whether	 the	
poor	benefited	more	than	the	rich	–	that	is,	whether	a	pro-poor	growth	situation	
occurred – is less certain.
Figure 5.1 Indonesia: Change in the Proportion of Poor People in Each 
Proince ersus Change in Proincial GDP per Capita,  
1990–2002 (%)
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literature focusing on pro-poor growth in the context of Indonesia is limited. 
Bidani	and	Ravallion	(1993)	were	the	first	to	observe	in	detail	the	relationship	
between the provincial poverty level and the provincial mean for household 
consumption in Indonesia. They found that in 1990 provincial poverty fell sig-
nificantly	by	more	 than	one	unit	when	mean	consumption	 increased	by	one	
unit,	 indicating	 that	 the	 poor	 had	 benefited	more	 than	 others	 from	ongoing	
economic growth. Balisacan, Pernia and Asra (2003) conducted another study 
on this subject using district-level panel data from the 1993, 1996 and 1999 
National Socioeconomic Surveys. They found that the mean per capita expen-
ditures of the poorest 20 per cent of the population increased by 0.7 of a unit 
when the overall average per capita income increased by one unit, indicating 
that	the	poor	had	benefited	less than others from ongoing economic growth. 
The	overall	conclusion	from	these	two	studies	is	that	the	poor	did	benefit	from	
economic	growth	during	the	1990s.	Whether	they	benefited	more	or	less	than	
the rich is not clear, however. 
3. PolICy REFoRMS: FRoM NATIoNAl 
GRoWTH To REGIoNAl DEVEloPMENT
This section discusses, in chronological order, major economic policy reforms 
that	had	significant	implications	for	regional	development.	It	is	important	to	
observe that not all of these economic reforms were implemented purely to 
resolve	a	particular	economic	problem;	some	were	aimed	at	deflecting	political	
pressure placed on the central government by the regions. 
The Natural Resources Boom
When Soeharto became president, he quickly realized the potential of Indone-
sia’s rich natural resources, particularly oil, gas, minerals and forests, to fund 
development. He also understood that only foreign companies had the capacity 
at	that	time	to	carry	out	large-scale	resource	extraction	activities.	In	the	first	
year of his presidency he enacted three important laws: law No. 1/1967 on 
foreign investment, which provided clear procedures for foreign companies 
operating in Indonesia as well as generous tax concessions; law No. 5/1967 
on forestry, which claimed all Indonesia’s forests, covering approximately 70 
per cent of the entire country, for the government; and law No. 11/1967 on 
mining, which inferred that all lands within the Republic of Indonesia could be 
used for mining. These three laws effectively opened up all of Indonesia’s for-
ests and minerals to extraction by large-scale industries with a foreign invest-
ment component.
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Within a few years oil-mining operations had been established through-
out the country. The largest ones were in Riau and South Sumatra, account-
ing for the increase in GDP in those two provinces during the late 1960s and 
early	1970s.	By	the	early	1970s,	significant	quantities	of	liquefied	natural	gas	
(lNG) and oil were being produced in Aceh and East Kalimantan, and copper 
in Papua. In the 1980s minerals such as coal, gold, tin and nickel, as well as 
Indonesia’s forests, were being exploited throughout the country, mostly in 
and around the off-Java islands. The primary factor in the development of the 
off-Java islands in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was certainly their rich natural 
resources. 
Nationally, export earnings from crude oil and petroleum products alone 
amounted to 32.8 per cent of total export earnings in 1970 (around $1 billion), 
increasing to 79.8 per cent of total export earnings in 1981 (around $8.5 bil-
lion). Thus natural resources were clearly the main source of national revenue. 
It is important to understand that most of the revenue from natural resources 
– from export earnings, contracts with companies and corporate taxes – went 
into the coffers of the central government. Aside from land taxes in mining 
areas and a small share of the royalties on forest products, regional govern-
ments received very little direct income from the natural resource extraction 
activities in their areas (Brodjonegoro and Martínez-Vázquez 2002). They did, 
however, receive some revenue from non-oil and gas mining activities from 
1992 onwards. 
Soeharto created a highly centralized form of government, achieved through 
the strong support of the military and his cronies. As a quid pro quo, the presi-
dent provided plenty of opportunities for the latter to engage in natural resource 
extraction activities, giving rise to claims of corruption, collusion and nepotism 
(Seda 2005).4
In	cabinet,	two	groups	influenced	the	pattern	of	government	spending.	The	
first	comprised	the	technocrats,	who	emphasized	the	need	to	invest	in	regional	
infrastructure and agricultural development. The strategy they advocated 
induced economic growth in some regions (Hill 2000a), and helped reduce 
poverty in rural areas in the 1970s and 1980s (Temple 2002). The second group 
comprised the nationalists, who emphasized the need to protect and develop 
various state enterprises. Although Soeharto followed the technocrats’ sugges-
tions, he was also attracted by the nationalists’ strategy for industrial develop-
ment. In addition to implementing policies to protect certain state enterprises, 
he handed out trade and manufacturing monopolies, credit facilities, govern-
ment contracts and other special opportunities to his closest cronies, the mili-
tary and members of his own family. By the early 1990s, corruption, collusion 
and nepotism had become a chronic problem in Indonesia.
However, the development of infrastructure and state enterprises did not 
favour the oil-producing regions as one might expect, but rather the islands of 
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Java and Bali. For example, even though Java is much smaller than Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi or Papua, it had more kilometres of roads per 1,000 
square kilometres of land area than any of the other islands in 1983, and this 
was still the case in 2002 (Figure 5.2).5	The	same	was	true	of	the	intensification	
program in the agricultural sector, which favoured the food crop sector, namely 
rice production, in Java–Bali. 
Intergovernmental Transfers: SDO, Block Grants and Inpres
Critics of Java-biased development and the central government’s reliance on 
natural resource revenue put strong pressure on Soeharto and the technocrats 
to develop a fairer system of sharing funds among the regions. In the early 
1970s two complementary intergovernmental schemes were established: the 
autonomous regional subsidy (Subsidi Daerah otonom or SDo) scheme and 
the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) scheme. The former was set up to cover 
the cost of paying regional government employees. The purpose of the latter 
was to support development in the regions. To ensure the appropriateness of 
government transfers for development, two types of Inpres grant were estab-
lished.	The	first	was	a	block	grant	to	governments	at	the	village,	district	and	
provincial levels giving regional authorities some control over how the funds 
Figure 5.2 Indonesia: Aailability of Roads across Proinces, 1993–2002 
(km/1,000km2)
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Source: BPS.
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were	spent.	The	second	was	a	specific	purpose	grant	 tied	to	a	particular	use	
specified	by	the	central	government,	such	as	building	schools,	providing	health	
services, reforestation (since 1977), building roads (since 1979) and accelerat-
ing development in less developed villages (since 1994) (Booth 1996). 
In the early 1970s, the total budget for the SDo scheme was much larger 
than	that	for	the	Inpres	scheme	–	roughly	five	times	as	large	in	the	1973/74	
financial	year,	for	example.	By	the	end	of	the	decade,	however,	the	latter	had	
expanded to encompass four different types of grant and was costing the cen-
tral government about as much as the SDo. The total budget for the SDo and 
Inpres schemes was set at around 16 per cent of the total central government 
budget during the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, when central government revenue 
increased due to the oil boom, the amount allocated to the SDo and Inpres 
schemes also increased, from Rp 49 billion in 1969/70 to Rp 3,223 billion in 
1984/85 (Devas 1989). 
Funds channelled through the SDo and Inpres schemes have always con-
stituted more than 60 per cent of the regional governments’ revenue, and more 
than 70 per cent since the 1980s (Booth 1989; Shah et al. 1994); under Soe-
harto regional governments had very little latitude to raise their own revenues 
by taxing economic activities in their region. It is therefore not surprising that 
the SDo and Inpres mechanisms became an important tool for Soeharto to 
increase his political support in the regions. In particular, the ‘presidential’ 
nomenclature of the Inpres scheme gave the explicit impression that Soeharto 
cared	about	and	was	personally	involved	in	addressing	specific	and	important	
aspects of development in the regions.
one of the more important variables in deciding the allocation of central 
government transfers across regions was population size. Hence, although on a 
per capita basis transfers to the more populous provinces of Java and Bali were 
not among the largest, these regions nevertheless received more in total trans-
fers	 than	other	regions.	 In	 the	1983/84	financial	year,	 for	example,	approxi-
mately 48 per cent of total SDo plus Inpres grants went to Java. It is important 
to note that the development of public infrastructure in the regions was not 
solely dependent on intergovernmental transfers; the sectoral expenditures of 
central government departments were also important. But with no clear for-
mula as to how each sectoral department should allocate its expenditure across 
regions,	in	the	1983/84	financial	year,	57	per	cent	of	total	sectoral	expenditures	
went to Java. 
Although the SDo and Inpres schemes were important in enabling regional 
governments to function, contributed to the development of infrastructure and 
had a positive effect on regional economic development, there is no strong 
indication that this intergovernmental policy alone was responsible for the 
high economic growth experienced by any region during this period (Ravallion 
1988). Intergovernmental transfers did, however, help to reduce the tensions 
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between the central government and regional governments in the 1970s and 
1980s, creating the political stability necessary for development to take place. 
This paved the way for the development of resource extraction industries in the 
off-Java islands and, in the 1980s, the development of labour-intensive indus-
tries in Java, Bali and several provinces in Sumatra and Sulawesi. 
The Inpres program for accelerating development in less developed villages 
deserves	special	attention	because	it	was	designed	specifically	to	combat	pov-
erty. Under this scheme, the central government transferred funds directly to 
selected poor villages: Rp 20 million per poor village that the community could 
use	on	economic	activities	that	would	benefit	many	village	members.	Between	
1994 and 1996 about 28,000 villages received this type of grant, 22 per cent 
of them in Java, 23 per cent in Sumatra and the rest in the other islands. Alatas 
(2000) argues that the program increased per capita total expenditure, employ-
ment and the school attendance rate in the recipient villages, but it is not as 
clear	whether	it	significantly	reduced	the	number	of	poor	people	in	the	country	
as a whole.
Migration Policy
The Indonesian government has never introduced policies that would have 
restricted the free movement of people across regions. overall, around 10 per 
cent of the population moved from one province to another during the 1980s. 
From time to time large cities like Jakarta have tried to reduce the number of 
immigrants, but without much success; in the early 1980s about 40 per cent of 
Jakarta’s population were migrants. lampung and East Kalimantan were other 
favoured destinations for migrants. Around 39 per cent of lampung’s popula-
tion in the early 1980s were poor people from Java attracted by the opportu-
nities in the agricultural sector, while the 1980s’ timber and mining boom in 
East Kalimantan attracted migrants from both Java and other islands. In 1990, 
around 29 per cent of the population of East Kalimantan were migrants. Clearly 
migration contributes to the process of equalizing interregional GDP per capita 
while also helping to balance interregional population growth (Tjiptoherijanto 
1997). 
In addition to allowing voluntary migration, the government introduced a 
transmigration program from Java–Bali (including lombok) to other islands 
in	1951.	The	scale	of	the	program	increased	significantly	after	the	government	
introduced law No. 3/1972 on transmigration. Although only around 95,000 
families joined the transmigration program in the 1950s and 1960s, the num-
bers rose to approximately 350,000 families in the 1970s and and 2.2 million 
in the 1980s (Tjiptoherijanto 1997).6 The three most popular destinations for 
these transmigrants were lampung, Jambi and Riau (Hardjono 1977; Bakir 
and Humaidi 1989). Indeed, lampung proved so popular that in the mid-1980s 
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the government announced that it would no longer be included as a destination 
option in the transmigration program; migrants were encouraged instead to 
choose Sulawesi, Kalimantan or Papua (Hill 1989b).
Economic Liberalization
The natural resources boom of the 1970s could not be sustained forever. oil 
prices dropped in 1982 and revenue from this sector started to contract, drasti-
cally reducing the basis and prospects for economic growth. Earnings from oil 
exports dropped from $10.6 billion in 1981/82 to $7.2 billion in 1982/83. The 
slide in oil prices continued until 1988, with a big drop from $27 per barrel 
in 1985 to $14 per barrel in 1986. Clearly, 1982 was a turning point from a 
regime of high, oil-fed growth to a new rhythm of decelerated growth and sta-
bilization of the economy to reduce its vulnerability to external shocks (Woo, 
Glassburner and Nasution 1994). 
of its own volition, the government quickly implemented a program of eco-
nomic liberalization, with the main goal of developing and diversifying the 
non-oil sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing and agriculture. 
The	program	covered	five	broad	categories	of	measures,	namely:	
1. trade and investment liberalization policies; 
2. exchange rate management, particularly to establish full currency convert-
ibility; 
3.	 a	conservative	monetary	policy	to	maintain	low	inflation	rates;	
4.	 financial/banking	liberalization	to	allow	state	banks	to	follow	market	prin-
ciples in attracting deposits and allocating credit, and to permit both domes-
tic and foreign banks to open branches in the regions; and 
5.	 a	tight	fiscal	policy	to	maintain	a	balanced	budget,	including	significant	cuts	
to subsidies and capital expenditures on large investment projects, and the 
introduction of new income, value-added and property taxes.7 
The primary objective of stimulating non-oil exports was achieved in a rela-
tively short period of time. By 1990 garment and textile-manufacturing indus-
tries, located mainly in Java, Bali and some parts of Sumatra, were becoming 
the champion of manufacturing exports. The effectiveness of the government’s 
liberalization policy was certainly enhanced by the superior availability of 
infrastructure in these areas. In Bali the reforms also induced high growth in 
tourism-related activities. Growth in GDP bounced back from as low as 2.5 
per cent in 1985 to 7.2 per cent in 1990. The manufacturing sector, which had 
accounted for 36 per cent of GDP in 1983, increased its share to 44 per cent in 
1996. over the same period the share of agriculture fell from 24 per cent to 16 
per	cent.	The	proportion	of	poor	people	declined	significantly,	particularly	in	
Java and some parts of Sumatra. 
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The	most	 significant	 shortcoming	was	 in	 the	area	of	privatization.	State-
owned industries continued to play a major role in the economy and resisted 
any	significant	move	towards	privatization.	This	situation	reflected	the	consid-
erable	influence	of	the	nationalists	on	the	president,	who	continued	to	award	
monopoly activities to his family and cronies, if to a lesser extent than before. 
The Eastern Indonesia Development Council
In the early 1990s, the main tension with regard to disparities in regional devel-
opment was no longer between Java and the off-Java islands, but between 
western Indonesia, consisting of Sumatra, Java and Bali, and eastern Indone-
sia, consisting of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara and Papua. 
Eastern Indonesia argued that it was lagging behind the rest of Indonesia, and 
needed a greater allocation of central government resources to help it catch up. 
In response to this criticism, the central government set up an interdepartmental 
forum known as the Eastern Indonesia Development Council. 
The council adopted a growth pole concept, selecting several areas in a 
number of eastern Indonesian provinces to receive favoured treatment as Inte-
grated Economic Development Zones (Kawasan Pengembangan Ekonomi 
Terpadu or Kapet). The government offered incentives such as tax holidays 
to attract investors to these areas. In addition, the sectoral departments on the 
Eastern	Indonesia	Development	Council	were	asked	to	allocate	a	significant	
proportion of their funds to promote development in the zones. 
No	significant	progress	was	made,	however,	even	after	 the	establishment	
in 2000 of a state department for the acceleration of development in eastern 
Indonesia. To date, none of the selected areas has matured to become a centre 
of growth, with the possible exception of the Manado–Bitung area, which was 
already growing relatively quickly even before the Eastern Indonesia Develop-
ment Council was established. 
The	failure	of	the	Kapet	scheme	to	make	significant	progress	is	commonly	
put down to a lack of initial infrastructure, a scarcity of trading partners and a 
lack of local government entrepreneurship. But one might also suspect a lack 
of commitment on the part of the central government, whose main purpose in 
implementing	the	program	may	have	been	to	deflect	the	demands	of	the	eastern	
Indonesian provinces for more funding. 
Crisis and Recovery 
In August 1997, like many other East Asian countries, Indonesia sank into 
economic crisis (see Hill 2000b). The construction sector was the hardest hit, 
recording	negative	growth	of	–36.4	per	cent	in	1998,	followed	by	the	financial	
sector (–26.6 per cent) and the manufacturing sector (–11.4 per cent). National 
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GDP contracted by 13.1 per cent. The crisis affected Java and Sumatra more 
than the other islands, and it affected the urban population more than the 
rural population. Between August 1997 and December 1998, the number of 
non-agricultural employees in the formal sector fell by 1.8 million. This was 
accompanied by an even larger increase in employment in the informal sector 
of 2.8 million. It appears that those laid off from the formal sector, as well as 
moving into the agricultural/rural sector, fended off poverty by taking lower-
quality jobs in the informal sector.
As the crisis worsened, social unrest spread and the political situation 
became	inflammatory.	In	May	1998,	a	massive	student	demonstration	in	pro-
test against a rise in fuel prices turned into large-scale rioting, arson and mass 
looting in Jakarta. In the aftermath of the riot, under threat of impeachment 
from no longer compliant leaders of parliament, Soeharto resigned from the 
presidency after 32 years in power. 
Indonesia turned to the International Monetary Fund for assistance in deal-
ing with the crisis in october 1997. In return for a standby loan of $43 bil-
lion, the government agreed to implement comprehensive economic reforms, 
including	 a	 financial	 restructuring	 program	 to	 strengthen	 the	weak	 banking	
system, a privatization and trade liberalization program and a good govern-
ance program (Soesastro and Basri 1998). Economic recovery, though slow, 
was	finally	achieved;	by	the	beginning	of	2003,	several	indicators	confirmed	
that the economy was on the right track. GDP grew modestly, bringing the 
contraction of the economy to an end. The provinces in Java and Sumatra that 
had been severely affected by the crisis were able to achieve approximately 4 
per cent growth (MacIntyre and Resosudarmo 2003). 
Big Bang Decentralization
one of the most interesting developments to come out of the fall of Soeharto 
was the drive towards regional decentralization. The new atmosphere of free-
dom created euphoria on the part of local governments, both provincial and 
district, inspiring them to demand greater autonomy to manage their own 
affairs. Habibie, the weak interim president, may have hoped to attract support 
from the regions by agreeing to provide greater regional autonomy (Mcleod 
2005). 
The new decentralization policy was formalized in law No. 22/1999 on 
local	autonomy	and	Law	No.	25/1999	on	fiscal	relations	between	the	central	
government and local governments, implemented in 2001. They delegated 
much greater authority to around 400 districts and municipalities in the areas of 
education, agriculture, industry, trade and investment, and infrastructure (Alm, 
Aten	and	Bahl	2001).	Only	security,	foreign	relations,	and	monetary	and	fis-
cal policy remained the responsibility of the central government (Government 
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Decree No. 25/2000). Suddenly the leaders of the district/municipality level of 
government acquired vast authority and responsibility, including receiving a 
huge transfer of civil servants from the central government departments oper-
ating within their jurisdictions. Hence many observers have called Indonesia’s 
decentralization process ‘big bang’ decentralization.
Far from enjoying the same level of authority as the district governments, 
under the new system provincial governments have generally remained weak. 
one theory for this is as follows. At the time the decentralization laws were 
being considered, separatist movements were active in Aceh, East Timor and 
Papua. one can therefore speculate that the military and the central govern-
ment did not want to increase the power of the provinces because they were 
afraid that this would only provoke further demands for independence. 
Under the new structure, regional governments receive a much larger pro-
portion of income tax and of the revenue generated by resource extraction 
activities in their regions, but not of other taxes such as the value-added tax 
(Table 5.4). The new revenue-sharing arrangements have boosted regional 
governments’	incomes	significantly,	especially	in	the	resource-rich	regions	of	
Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua.
The SDo and Inpres schemes have been replaced by two new types of 
transfer from the central government to regional governments: the general 
block	 grant	 (Dana	Alokasi	Umum	 or	DAU)	 and	 the	 specific	 purpose	 grant	
(Dana Alokasi Khusus or DAK). Regional governments have complete control 
over the use of the DAU, which – except in the four resource-rich provinces 
and Jakarta – usually comprises around 70 per cent of their total revenue. The 
formula for determining the allocation of the DAU has been developed in such 
a way that it also plays a role in reducing per capita inequalities in the distri-
bution	of	revenue	across	regions.	The	purpose	of	the	DAK	is	to	fund	specific	
projects.	So	far,	however,	transfers	of	this	type	have	been	insignificant,	leaving	
central–regional	transfers	as	the	dominant	means	of	financing.	With	the	ear-
marking of funds largely gone, regional governments now clearly have more 
control over where to allocate their resources. Especially at the district/munici-
pality level of government, they also have more freedom to generate their own 
sources of revenue by imposing new taxes and charges within their jurisdic-
tions, as well as to raise funds through borrowing (World Bank 2003).
Nevertheless, the new regulations have been criticized as being inadequate 
in providing practical guidance, particularly to district/municipality govern-
ments, on how to implement the decentralization process. Their main failing is 
that they do not directly specify the obligatory tasks and functions of district/
municipality governments, concentrating instead on those of the central and 
provincial governments (World Bank 2003). 
The	first	 immediate	 impact	of	 the	 implementation	of	 the	decentralization	
laws	was	thus	to	increase	the	level	of	conflict	between	the	central	government	
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and the regions, especially over key areas in which the central government was 
determined to maintain its authority. In the case of oil resources, for example, 
the central government asserted its authority and claimed 85 per cent of the 
revenue generated by this sector despite the regions’ continuing demands for 
greater responsibility in this area. In other cases where the central government 
has lost most of its responsibilities, its resistance has been evident in a limited 
commitment to the decentralization process (Resosudarmo 2005). 
The second immediate impact concerns the nature of corruption. The era 
of a centralized political system has been replaced by one in which power 
and authority have become much more diffused. This has overturned the cen-
tralized, ‘one-stop shopping’ nature of corruption, to be replaced by a more 
fragmented	system	in	which	government	officials,	the	military	and	police,	and	
legislative members at both the national and regional levels all collect bribes 
(Kuncoro 2004; Kuncoro and Resosudarmo 2004). 
The third immediate impact of the decentralization policy has been to cre-
ate a plethora of local nuisance taxes (lewis 2003). The main impetus for the 
creation of new taxes has been the increased expenditure responsibilities of 
regional governments, particularly at the district/municipality level. Although 
delighted	with	the	decentralization	policy,	regional	governments	find	that	their	
responsibilities have increased enormously due to the transfer of several cen-
tral government functions. These include the necessity to pay the salaries of the 
several thousand central government employees transferred to regional-level 
jobs and the provision of public services previously provided by central gov-
ernment departments, such as primary and secondary education, health clinics, 
local and regional roads, and water supply and sewerage services. Although 
officially	the	financing	of	salaries	and	related	expenditures	should	be	covered	
by the DAU, in practice there have been problems with the timing of disburse-
ments, and in many cases district governments have had to provide advances 
out of their own funds to bridge the gap. Even if the DAU does arrive on time, 
sometimes	 it	 is	 sufficient	only	 to	pay	 salaries,	with	not	 enough	 left	 over	 to	
cover other expenses like maintenance and materials. Another reason for the 
excessive number of new taxes is simply local governments’ euphoria at their 
increased powers under decentralization, which has led to an obsession with 
creating new taxes as an indicator of ‘success’. Corrupt behaviour by some 
local	officers	has	also	played	a	part	in	the	creation	of	new	taxes	(Kuncoro	and	
Resosudarmo 2004).
All three of these impacts have delayed the recovery of investment. The 
level of investment, particularly foreign direct investment, in the early 2000s 
was far below the pre-crisis level, feeding into national and provincial eco-
nomic growth rates that were also below pre-crisis levels. Recovery has been 
particularly slow in the off-Java islands, including Aceh, Riau, East Kaliman-
tan	and	Papua	where	local	government	revenues	have	increased	significantly.	
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The main problem in these resource-rich provinces appears to have been their 
failure	 to	 invest	 sufficiently	 in	 infrastructure.	To	 take	 just	one	 indicator,	 the	
proportion of paved to unpaved roads has not increased any faster in these 
provinces than in Java.
Despite these immediate challenges, the fact that Indonesia has been able 
to carry out such an ambitious decentralization program within such a short 
period	of	time	without	incurring	any	significant	social	or	political	costs	is	an	
important	 achievement.	 Now,	 after	 five	 years	 of	 implementation,	 there	 are	
signs that the decentralization policy will eventually lead to a better Indonesia. 
In 2004, to address some of the problems associated with the implementation 
of decentralization, parliament enacted two new decentralization laws, law 
No. 32/2004 on regional autonomy to replace law No. 22/1999, and law No. 
33/2004	on	regional	finance	to	replace	Law	No.	25/1999.	If	implemented	prop-
erly,	these	new	laws	should	soften	the	conflict	between	the	central	government	
and regional governments over authority for several key areas of responsibil-
ity, result in a better distribution of the DAU, and place some much needed 
controls on the number and type of local taxes.
A preliminary study by lPEM-UI (2005) indicates that, in time, the process 
of decentralization should itself contribute to an improvement in government 
performance and a reduction in corruption in the regions. The authors argue 
that as regional governments come to terms with their new responsibilities 
under decentralization and are held directly accountable by their constituents, 
this should create an incentive for an improvement in regional government per-
formance – one aspect of which is a reduced prevalence of corrupt behaviour 
(Persson and Tabellini 2004). local governments that appreciate the impor-
tance of attracting business and investment to their regions will also under-
stand that business people and investors are reluctant to commit themselves 
to	regions	in	which	the	quality	of	public	services	is	poor	and	corrupt	officials	
are likely to impose heavy costs on their operations. In the end, competition 
among Indonesia’s several hundred local governments to attract business and 
investment may well prove an effective means of improving the quality of 
public services and discouraging corrupt behaviour. 
4. lESSoNS APPlICABlE To oTHER 
CoUNTRIES
To summarize the most important aspects of Indonesia’s regional development 
experience, from the early 1970s to mid-1990s the economy grew relatively 
fast	and	poverty	 fell	 significantly	 in	most	provinces	without	much	affecting	
disparities in provincial income per capita. From the mid-1990s to early 2000s, 
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due to the 1997–98 economic crisis, Indonesia grew at a much slower rate 
than in the previous two decades. During this period of slow growth, levels 
of provincial poverty and disparities in provincial income per capita remained 
largely unchanged. Some of the more important policy lessons that can be 
drawn from the Indonesian experience are as follows. 
First, a stable political environment and the provision of regional infra-
structure are the foundation for regional development. Indonesia is fortunate in 
having rich mineral and forest resources. Soeharto’s decision to create opportu-
nities for international companies to extract these resources, besides inducing 
development in a few provinces, was the key to generating huge national rev-
enues	throughout	the	1970s.	Soeharto	and	his	economic	team	spent	significant	
amounts of this revenue, through sectoral department budgets and intergovern-
mental transfers, on infrastructure development in the regions. This spending 
reduced, but did not eliminate, the tensions between the central government and 
regional governments and in the end helped create an environment of politi-
cal stability in the regions. In addition national elites, particularly the military, 
were allowed to become involved in natural resource extraction activities. As 
a result, corruption, collusion and nepotism became rampant even though the 
national political environment remained relatively stable. 
Second, investing in the agricultural sector is important, even though this 
may not induce a high rate of regional development. In addition to investing in 
general regional infrastructure, Soeharto and his economic team spent some of 
the	profits	from	the	natural	resource	boom	on	the	agricultural	sector,	particu-
larly agricultural infrastructure. This investment paid off when oil revenues 
declined	significantly	in	the	early	1980s	and	when	the	economy	collapsed	in	
1997–98, because the agricultural sector, including estate crops, was able to 
generate some revenue for the country and, together with the informal sector, 
absorb labour laid off from other sectors. 
During more normal years, the expansion of the agricultural sector induced 
greater activity in rural sectors, contributing to a decline in the number of poor 
people in the countryside. It is important to note that the development of the 
agricultural	sector	in	the	off-Java	islands	also	benefited	from	the	transmigra-
tion program as well as from the voluntary migration of people from Java.
Third, allowing people to move freely from one region to another contrib-
utes to the equalization of interregional GDP per capita as well as balanc-
ing interregional population growth. The Indonesian experience shows that 
a	 significant	 number	 of	 people	migrated	 from	provinces	with	 a	 lower	GDP	
per capita to provinces with a higher GDP per capita, namely from Central 
and	East	Java	to	Lampung,	Jambi,	East	Kalimantan	and	Jakarta.	A	significant	
number of people also moved from provinces with a high population density to 
provinces with a lower population density, namely from Java to other islands, 
including Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Papua. 
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Fourth, the economic liberalization policy instituted to boost the national 
economy also turned out to be effective in inducing development in some 
regions. The main goal of the reform program was to boost the development of 
the non-oil and gas sector, particularly the manufacturing and agricultural sec-
tors. In the stable political environment of the 1980s and early to mid-1990s, 
with infrastructure improving, the reforms were able to induce high economic 
growth. During this period, labour-intensive, export-oriented industries were 
the champions of regional development, inducing an economic transformation 
from a mainly agriculture-dominated to a more industrialized economy. The 
growth of labour-intensive industries was certainly behind the fall in poverty 
in urban areas, particularly in Java and some parts of Sumatra. The country’s 
ability to switch from resource-based to labour-intensive, manufacturing-based 
development helped reduce disparities in regional income per capita or at least 
did	not	increase	them.	Bali	benefited	significantly	from	the	policy	of	establish-
ing direct international connections.
Fifth, decentralization or increased regional autonomy, although impor-
tant in promoting regional development, does not immediately produce the 
intended	 results	 and	 in	 the	meantime	may	 induce	 significant	 problems.	 For	
large nations such as Indonesia, it is clear that there is a limit on what the 
central government can do to induce further development in outlying regions. 
local governments, which have a better knowledge of their own regions and 
are more accountable to the local people, have the potency to act as the proper 
agents to induce effective regional development. It is only natural that, at some 
stage of development, countries will wish to give their regional areas greater 
autonomy. However, a big bang decentralization policy, at least in the short 
run,	 can	 result	 in	 intergovernmental	 conflict,	 political	 instability	 and	uncer-
tainty among investors, deterring both domestic and foreign capital investment 
and	in	the	end	stymieing	effective	regional	development.	Although,	after	five	
years of implementation, Indonesia’s decentralization policy shows signs of 
eventually having a positive effect, managing decentralization remains the 
major challenge facing the country as it seeks to promote further national and 
regional economic development.
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1. Because most revenues from mining activities, particularly oil and gas, go to the central gov-
ernment, regional GDP without mining is a better indicator of the performance of a regional 
economy than GDP with mining.
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2. The negative growth rate in South Sumatra was mainly due to the separation of Bangka-
Belitung, its fastest-growing region, as a separate province. Hence, in addition to experiencing 
negative growth in GDP, its GDP per capita also declined. 
3. The negative growth rate in North Sulawesi was mainly due to the separation of Gorontalo 
as a separate province. However, because Gorontalo was growing more slowly than North 
Sulawesi as a whole, North Sulawesi still experienced positive growth in GDP per capita. 
4. Corruption had always been a serious issue in Indonesia, but one could argue that it became 
worse during the Soeharto era.
5. Note that this was not the case in terms of kilometres of roads per rupiahs of provincial GDP.
6. These numbers include both transmigrants fully supported by the government and partially 
supported or ‘spontaneous’ transmigrants. like the former, the latter received land from the 
government	and	five-year	subsidies	to	cover	basic	needs.	However,	they	did	not	receive	any	
training and they had to cover their own moving costs.
7. For a detailed discussion of the economic liberalization program during this period, see Thor-
becke (1992). 
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